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PITFALLS
"First, development professionals do not know how to carry
out an effective economic development program, either a big one or
a small one. No one knows how - not the u.s. government, not the
Rockefeller Foundation, not the international banks and agencies,
not the missionaries. I don't know how. You don't know how. No one
knows how. Second, we don't know that we don I t know how. II
(Paddock, W. and Paddock, E., 1973, pp. 299-300).
The quotation above from the Paddocks I 1973 book entitled: "We
Don't Know How" aptly sets the stage for this paper. William and
Elizabeth Paddock made their statement at the conclusion of a year
long field research in Mexico and Central America in the late
1960s. Their investigation included some fifty projects which were
selected as among the best by the agency officials under whose
auspices they were conducted. The Paddocks' stated intention was to
produce a document based on successful experience in a variety of
projects 'which could become a useful guide for application
elsewhere. Their unfortunate conclusion was that none of the
projects had worked as planned.
Beginning in the early seventies, it became popular to
document the failures of development projects both in the
international and u.S. domestic arenas. This paper does not attempt
to provide a compendium of project failures. One need go no farther
than the local news stand or listen to nightly newscasts to
understand that we li~ in a sea of failures, some very large,
expensive and dangerous ones and others not so cataclysmic in
nature. The spaceship Challenger explosion and the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor melt down are two recent examples of large scale
failures. Smaller scale case studies of development project
failures are reported regularly by The Development Communication
Report published quarterly by the Clearing House on Development
Communication.
Several authors have addressed the problems of project
implementation and the failure to meet specified objectives. The
evaluation literature abounds with documentation of project
failure. A'few citations from this extensive body of literature on
the international and u.S. domestic fronts are provided below.
A number of authors including Eramus (1961, 1968);
Brokensha and Hodge (1969); Speight (1973); and Ho1dcroft (1978)
have examined and written about the problems of community
2development in Third World countries. The Atlantic Monthly of April
1985 carries an article by Jack Shepherd which chronicles a number
of failed aid projects in Africa, including those of the soviet
union. In July 1985 the Wall Street Journal ran an eight piece
series on failed development efforts in Africa. Rondinelli (1976)
observed that "Despite more than a quarter of a century of
intensive experience with project investment, international funding
institutions and ministries of less developed countries still
report serious problems in project execution". Samuel Paul (1982)
cites such authors as Grindel, Lele, Siffin and some United Nations
reports that document the limited effectiveness and "dismal
outcomes of several development projects" in the third world. He
also refers to a wide variety of studies in the u.S. which have
shown poor project outcomes.
Mullen and Dumpson (1972) reviewed the findings of thirteen
major social experiments as well as other social work interven-
tions in the united States. They say: "the effectiveness of
professional social work intervention has been a matter of concern
for at least forty years" One of the earliest experimental design
studies of juvenile delinquency (the Cambridge-Somerville Youth
Study) concluded that the incidence of delinquency had not been
reduced through treatment. other studies show that psychotherapy
treatment for neurotics is no more effective than no treatment at
all. In reporting on the Coleman report· regarding the 1 imited
contribution of schools to education, Egon Guba states: "This
conclusion is incredible ... it means, if true, that it makes
little difference whether a teacher is good or bad, whether good or
poor materials are available, or whether the school is a barn or a
geodesic dome: students will learn about the same" (Guba, 1972).
Danziger and Weinberg (1986) observe that although a simple
correlation between spending and the level of poverty obscures many
complexities, nevertheless, it is clear that in spite of twenty
years of increased spending the level of poverty hasn't declined
very much. They say that education, employment and training
programs have only shown marginal gains due in part to limited
funding. These authors conclude that even with adequate funding the
results would probably be he same because we still do not know how
to improve the education and employment prospects of the poor.
Income transfers were not a major component of the War on Poverty
or Great Society programs. However, income transfers, they say,
have been responsible for the greatest rise ever in social spending
and these transfers have furthermore been responsible for much of
the limited declines in poverty, especially for the elderly. At the
same time, income "transfers have not promoted self-sufficiency
among the able-bodied poor, an important goal of the poor and
taxpayers alike." Largely forgotten perhaps is Moynihan's (1969)
Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding about the difficulties faced in
implementing community action programs throughout the u.S.
The references above are a very small sampling of the written
material regarding failed projects and programs. This list could be
extended almost indefinitely. Freeman (1980), has made the
dreariest statement of all when he concluded that "most human
3resource, health improvement and social development programs -
regardless of geographical location and sponsorship - have been
misguided, misconceived, badly implemented and ineffective".
The contention of this paper is that most projects do not work
as planned and that this is true of brick and mortar projects as
well as projects aimed at human, economic or social development.
Furthermore, one shouldn't expect them to. One might go so far as
to say that it isn't possible for projects to work as planned.
Although the paper attempts to explain the reasons why
projects don't usually work as planned, it is not intended to be a
negative analysis. It is rather an attempt at attitude adjustment
wherein we change our assumptions, expectations and definitions
concerning project planning, implementation, evaluation and
success. In.addition to identifying the various reasons for project
failure, the principles and practices related to project success
are also identified. Thus, the paper attempts to strike a positive
note concerning steps to take to increase the probability of
successful project implementation and to suggest more realistic
attitudes and expectations toward project outcomes.
The various reasons for project failure are discussed within
ten separate but not necessarily mutually exclusive categories. The
first category to be discussed has to do with the data base on
which projects are designed. This is followed by sections on
Assumptions, Externalities, Communication and Miscommunication,
Time and Cost Estimates and ~redictions, Variables, Corruption,
Probabilities, Evaluation and Measurement and Bureaucratization and
Goal Displacement. Because the categories overlap and are highly
interrelated, they are treated as equals in their effect or
explanatory force for why projects don't work as planned. However,
when operating in concert with each other in the real world their
impact greatly exceeds their individual force. The numbering system
is simply for identification purposes i not for establishing a
priority system.
I THE DATA BASE
Most projects are initially conceived of in terms of some
problem to be alleviated, if not solved. This somewhat innocent
statement leads directly into one of the basic and fundamental
reasons why many projects fail to achieve their objectives. Lurking
within this statement is the need to define what the problem is.
The importance of problem definition lies in its corollary of
problem solution. The "solution" lies within the definition of the
problem. Thus, if you say people are hungry because food production
is low then you are likely to conclude that the solution to hunger
is to raise food production. On the other hand, it you say the
reason people are hungry is because they don't have enough money to
purchase food, then you are might conclude that the solution to
hunger is employment. Problems are usually defined through a data
base. One typical technique for doing this is the so-called "gap"
analysis. This technique may take several forms but basically it
simply describes and then contrasts a present situation with a more
4desirable one. Some have labeled this the visioning process. The
difference between the two situations equals the problem to be
resolved. For example, if the current per capita food consumption
is 1,600 calories and the desired level is 2,300 calories, then the
problem is to raise daily food consumption by 700 calories.
Unfortunately, the data base which constitutes the foundation for
most projects is unreliable to an unknown degree. In many cases,
data are incomplete and invalid. One does well to remember the much
quoted observation, even if apocryphal, of the British economist,
Sir Josiah Stamp who served in England's Inland Revenue Department
from 1896-1919, to wit: "The Government are very keen on amassing
statistics. They collect them, add them, raise them to the nth
power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you
must never forget that everyone of these figures comes in the
first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what
he damn pleases."
Polly Hill (1984) in commenting on official Third World
statistics, has observed that data collectors often record their
own guesses as answers to questionnaires or 'extract' answers "by
resorting to many convolutions, blandishments and deceits".
Furthermore, higher level administrators are not aware "that ground
level workers are not necessarily the honest, professional ,
knowledgeable people with a real understanding of local conditions
. but are commonly under-trained, lonely, under-supervised,
overworked, ignorant, bored, underpaid strangers who may be forced
into corruption - inclUding collusion with respondents who have
rightly persuaded them of ,the futility of their task". One could
also add that such personnel don't always understand the nature of
the questionnaire they are administering and thus don't always
obtain responses that actually answer the question in the way it
was intended.
Robert Kuttner (1985) cites two well known economists, namely,
Oskar Morgenstern and Wassily Leontief with regard to the data
bases used in industrial countries. Morgenstern points out that
most economic statistics are unreliable because, for one thing,
people responding a official questionnaires, often lie. Also,
economists often make use of second-hand data which are collected
for purposes quite different than economic analysis -or, even
worse, as Leontief says, most economic models don't make use of any
data at all!
In summary, due to unreliable, incomplete, inaccurate or
non-existent data bases; the first requirement of good proj ect
planning and problem definition is often not met.
II ASSUMPTIONS
Most projects, designed to serve people or to meet the needs
of a given client population, are based on several sets of
assumptions. One set of assumptions relates to the population to be
served. Here the assumptions include what the people want and how
they will react to the offerings of the program or project. People
are usually assumed to be rational decision makers who will act to
5maX1m1ze their economic benefit and further that the offerings of
the program will be viewed as instrumental in achieving the
clientele's objectives. When people don't seem to respond
"properly" some economists have concluded that there is nothing
wrong with the theory of economic rationality except for human
perversity. other theoreticians argue that if the world doesn't
conform to the analytical models; then it is unfortunate for the
world. Thus it would seem that there is some recognition that
people may not always act according to theoretical models but in
spite of this, the assumptions of rational economic behavior
persist.
Closely aligned with the rationality assumption is the
assumption of homogeneous or at least very similar reactions and
behavior on the part of people in all communities or areas of the
country. Following this assumption, the same services are made
available to all program clientele regardless of their differences.
Related to this is an assumption that all workers can deliver the
services equally well if given the proper training. Rutman (1980)
confirms Selznick's organization-paradox regarding the division of
labor when he observes that personnel at different levels of the
organization and delivery sites interpret the purpose of the
program differently and thus perform in quite different ways. This
sometimes results in the program not being delivered at all!
Community development practitioners are fond of saying that one of
the most important tools of the trade is the personality of the
practitioner. Insofar as this is true and different professionals
interpret a program-differently, it can result in the same program
being offered differently in different locations depending who the
practitioner is. According to Sarason (1972), all projects involve
the creation of new settings or organizational structures. These
need to be created within the traditional and historical context of
the local community. Planners he says, tend to assume identical
structures for their projects and thus obtain quick take-offs and
crash landings.
Assumptions us~lly go unnoticed and unchallenged until some
astute observer or interest group brings them to light. Throughout
the developing world and in industrial countries as well, most
agricultural development projects have assumed that the main
clientele was a male farmer. Programs were universally directed
toward men, including those farm enterprises which only women
perform! The "women in development" movement has been working hard
to correct this assumption with varying degrees of success. A good
deal of what happens in community development at the local level is
done by women and yet this is still a male dominated profession. A
study by Lackey and Burke (1984) showed that female membership in
the Community Development Society had increased threefold between
1970 and 1980, but even at its peak female membership was only 21
per cent. Extension workers throughout the world, with very few
exceptions such as Vietnam and Botswana, tend to be primarily male.
Another set of assumptions about the clientele assumes that
the people have full faith and confidence in the change agents,
usually government or voluntary agency employees, and will
6therefore listen to their advice. Also, planners may implicitly
assume that the people have an interest in helping the country to
meet its macroeconomic or other goals which may be contained in
some overall plan. This latter assumption rests on some other ones
which relate to a sense of national identity and the desire to be
of service to the larger community. All of these assumptions need
to be challenged and carefully tested.
III EXTERNALITIES
A different set of assumptions relates to the environment
within which the project "operates. will the environment be the same
throughout all implementation phases or will it change? If changes
are assumed, what direction will they take and what will be the
magnitude of these changes? Some of the important variables which
come into play in this area include such things as the stability of
the government and its policies - this includes continuity of
personnel involved in the proj ect and the funding levels. The
stability of the economy in its domestic and international
dimensions, including such things as inflation, revenues, world
prices and exchange rates also have to be assumed or the magnitude
and direction of change estimated. Clearly, what is happening in
Mexico today on the one hand due to the drop in oil prices and what
is happening today in the u.S. due to the federal deficit and the
Graham-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget legislation severely
restrict the implementation and funding of many projects. It might
be useful to put a warning on all approved project documents to the
effect that "personnel, policies and funding may change without
notice".
It is instructive to note that in estimating time requirements
for projects in the Program Review Evaluation System (PERT),
planners are advised to ignore events which happen infrequently
such as fires/, floods, hurricanes, etc. (Moder et ale ,1983).
Another, and extremely important aspect of the environment within
which projects operate is related to the cause and effect of the
problem to be "solved". Freeman (1980) has tackled this issue and
provided some cogent insights into the capacity of proj ects to
produce positive results. Projects, he says, are aimed "at narrow
band of community members' life space". However, the problems being
addressed are encased within an overall socio-political-cultural
structure which acts to limit the effectiveness of narrowly
targeted approaches. For example, if variables like poverty, family
conditions, culture, environmental factors and corrupt values
explain things such as juvenile delinquency and crime; then
narrowly focused programs aimed, for example, at providing
recreation, will not have much impact. If the social-economic-
political environment is defective then projects can not be
effective until these underlying causes are corrected. What this
appears to be saying is that project planners are not giving
sufficient attention to the causal analysis to understand the
nature of the problem being observed. Altschuld, et ale (1982) seem
to agree and suggest that the explanation for this lack of causal
analysis may lie in the cost and time required to perform this type
of research. According to Cathie (1982) the high rate of project
7failure in the U.N.'s World Food Program is due in part to the
inadequacy of pre-project appraisal. His calculations show that on
average only 3.6 minutes are spent on examining and approving World
Food Program projects. The urgency for action has given rise to the
wise crack: "Don't just stand there; do something!; even if it's
wrong". This has been countered by the Reagan administration
program cutters with: "Don't just stand there; un do something!"_
A commonly neglected part of the environment has to do with
the reactions and opposition to projects from persons, organiza-
tions and interest groups who are not included or who see the
proj ect as detrimental in some way to their interests. Some
negative reactions may be a result of jealousy and part may be
attributed to the well known but often ignored proposition that
projects' costs and benefits and costs are distributed differen-
tially within the community. The adverse consequences of projects
and their distribution within the community are usually overlooked
but they can result in unanticipated opposition and/or sabotage
with serious effects on project operation.
Not to be forgotten is the very important atmosphere within
which projects operate. When the economy is booming, when spirits
are high, when optimism prevails and when the leadership of the
country is behind the social development enterprise there tends to
be an enormous amount of attention and resources given to the
establishment of administrative mechanisms to implement pOlicies
aimed at solving identified problems. These approaches usually turn
out to be short lived fads which have been characterized as solving
problems by "throwing money at them". Part of the difficulty
created by these overenthusiastic programs manned .by zealous,
usually young, professionals is the demand to be successful. This
atmosphere sometimes results in pushing programs too hard, ignoring
the realities and feedback from the constituents, giving excessive
attention to the success stories, cutting corners and fUdging the
data to make the project look good to insure continued funding. One
of the conclusions of the Rogers Commission investigating the space
shuttle challenger disaster was that the schedule of flights was
too difficult to maintain and thus some corners were cut.
On the other hand, when economies are in depression, or when
attention is given to other priorities, such as the defense budget,
then the atmosphere isn't particularly conducive to funding large
scale social development programs and project failure is used as a
weapon for the discontinuance of programs. In this atmosphere,
proj ects not only fail to achieve their obj ectives ; they are
killed.
IV COMMUNICATION AND MISCOMMUNICATION
"I know that you believe you understand what you think I said,
but I am not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I
meant" •
What better way is there to introduce the problem of conveying
meaning from one person, group, agency or institution to another?
8Historians will record and long debate what was actually said by
America's President Ronald Reagan and soviet Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev at. the now historic meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in
October, 1986. Fortunately, this communication gag was recognized
immediately thus providing an opportunity to arrive at some
clarification and possible agreement. Unfortunately, in many other
cases, these areas of confusion, lack of agreement, and
misunderstanding are not detected until things go wrong and varying
degrees of damage are done.
An example of communication gone awry was the diplomatic
blunder committed by a contract interpreter carefully screened and
selected by the U. S. state Department to translate President
carter's 1977 news conference in Poland. When President Carter said
he wanted to learn the opinions and desires of the Polish people it
was translated to the effect that he desired the Poles carnally
(Simon, 1980). A reference to the day he "left the united States"
was rephrased as "the day I abandoned the united States." Some
other translation problems are illustrated by some other material
compiled by Laurie (1981) as reported in Harpers, May 1981. When
Chevrolet introduced its Nova model into Latin America it was
translated into Spanish as "No Va" which means: " it doesn't go".
Apparently sales picked up after the name was changed to Caribe
(Paul Simon as quoted by Laurie, 1981). "Body by Fisher" was
translated in Flemish as "Corpse by Fisher". S~hweppes Tonic Water
in Italian gets treated as "bathroom water". In Chinese, "Come
Alive with Pepsi" might well be translated to suggest that Pepsi
will bring your ancestors back from the grave! Another interesting
wrinkle was Colgate-Palmolive's toothpaste "Cue". This was given
the proper translation in France, but unfortunately, "Cue" was also
the name of a popular book on oral sex. An ad for laundry soap in
Quebec was touted to produce clean genitals (Rose Hayden as quoted
by Laurie, 1981). These examples serve to illustrate some of the
difficulties inherent in transmitting ideas, words, and concepts
from one language to another. However, the communication problem is
not limited to the translation of words across languages.
"Oh, I didn't know that's what you meant" is an oft repeated
phrase in English which tends to clear the air and expose a
previous misunderstanding. At the proj ect level, all manner of
difficulties can arise through faulty communication. A well known
phenomenon is the change in meaning which messages take on as they
pass through different channels or levels of an organization.
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) cite an example of why a pUblic
health project in Peru failed to convince villagers to boil their
water. After two years of efforts trying to convince housewives to
boil their water only 11 of the 200 women adopted this
practice. The analysis of this failure indicated that the boiling
of water carried a social meaning within the culture which wasn't
understood or appreciated by the public health educators. In this
village, the boiling of water was associated with being ill. Only
sick people ever boiled water, but this wasn't because of an
understanding of germ theory. People boiled water because of a
classification scheme which separates foods and liquids into "cold"
9and "hot" categories with attendant prescriptions about when to eat
or drink them. "Cold" foods were thought to be bad when you were
ill. Cold water is classified as a "cold" food. Thus, people boiled
water to make it less "cold", not to kill germs. Tradition dictated
that well people should not drink boiled water. Lacking this
knowledge, the message of the public health change agent who
lectured about killing germs was not received as intended. To adopt
this practice in the eyes of the villagers would have been to admit
to being sick and to go against custom which only a few women were
prepared to do. The message sent was not the message received.
Three macro-variables are of fundamental importance to the
communication process. One of these is the fact that different
people in different circumstances at different times perceive the
world around them differently. Thus, the same message isn't
received the same way by everyone or even by the same people at
different times. A second macro-variable resides in the nature of
the language itself. Exactly the same word(s) can mean, and are
used to mean, quite different things. Thus, as Middleton and Hsu
Lin (1975) point out "family planning" in one context may mean
planning the financial security for the parents and children in
later years and in another context the same words mean the spacing
of children through the use of some form of birth control. Another
dimension of the language problem lies in the use of jargon or
other arcane words which only the select few are able to
understand. While many may have heard the three blind mice nursery
rhyme, who would be able to understand or recite it if it were
couched in some more scientific terminology as one wit has done, as
follows: "A triumvirate of murine rodents devoid of ophthalmic
acuity were observed in a state of rapid locomotion in pursuit of
an agriculturalist's uxorial adjunct. Said adjunct then performed
a triple caudectomy utilizing an acutely honed bladed instrument
used for subdivision of edible tissue". While this is a humorous
and perhaps improbable example of the use of English, the following
real life examples suggest that passages like this aren't exactly
unknown. Three examples quoted in A.I.D.'s Front Lines are (1) 'In
the Niger River Basin, Nigeria is the only truly downstream state.
The remaining eight countries are either strictly upstream
countries or as in the cases of Mali, Niger and Benin, they are
downstream countries and up stream to those which are downstream
from them', (2) 'In view of a tight supply situation here, the ECA
is not in a position to present a justifiable claim for
requirements arrived at in the above manner unless the total
requirements from which the residual was obtained were based on
minimum essential needs and the amounts designated from. other
sources represent maximum availabilities',and (3) 'The project's
benefit stream is a function of the social rate alternately of the
opportunity shadow rate for urban consumers, surplus benefits
and/or'resource savings' (Agency for International Development,
1979, p. 1; 1981 p. 4.).
The communication problem inherent in the English language, is
well illustrated by a quote from General John W. Vessey, Jr. former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "From my own experience, I
can tell you, more has been screwed up on the battlefield and
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misunderstood in the Pentagon because of a lack of understanding of
the English language than any other single factor." (New York Times
Magazine, 1984). As (Goldstein, 1985) points out the problem of
understanding is often one of how clearly something is written.
Commenting on the communication problem inherent in the use of
language, (Ofshe, 1970) observes that if a system of perfect
"communication could be established, it would change every aspect
of society as we know it... The necessity of relying on a
relatively crude medium of communication, language, it is argued,
makes it impossible for anyone ever to convey his cognitions
precisely to another." ( p. 62.) Thirdly, it makes a world of
difference as to who and how the message(s) are communicated. Sex,
age, and ethnicity all playa part here. The use of demonstrators,
radio, newspapers, posters, formal versus informal means all make
important differences in the success of the communicated message.
Roy, Waisanen and Rogers (1969) report on a research project in
India which showed that the use of trained villagers (animators)
to communicate improved practices actually reduced the level of
acceptance of agricultural and health practices as compared to the
control villages.
V TIME AND COST ESTIMATES AND PREDICTIONS
It is common knowledge that projects often take more time and
money than originally anticipated. Cost overruns are almost
becoming expected for large scale projects. The magnitude of such
presumably unanticipated costs may be illustrated by the $436.00
hammer. As documented ,in the Congressional Record of May 15,1984,
the u.S. Navy paid Gould Electronics $436.00 for a hammer which
retails at $7.66. Even worse was the Defense Department's purchase
of a wrench for $1,150 which retails for under $5.00.
All kinds of unexpected and thus unplanned for problems arise
during project implementation which result in costly time delays.
In Third World situations, a major area of difficulty seems to
reside in the logistics area. This is particularly true, but not
limited to the transportation system. One can almost predict some
sort of breakdown in the transportation system on which timely
project implementation depends. Vehicles don't arrive as scheduled
or they breakdown unexpectedly and can't be fixed due to lack of
spare parts or competent personnel. Moris (1981) makes a convincing
case that time estimates for LDC projects are usually unrealistic
because project planners working in artificial isolation ignore the
realities of the system in which projects must be implemented. In
more industrial countries,· unexpected delays and breakdowns occur
frequently as a result of computer failure.
In estimating time requirements for project operations some
form of PERT or the critical Path Method (CPM) is often used. Time
requirements for individual project activities within the PERT
system, which many project planners use, are estimated with the
11
following formula:
a + 4m + b
te = -------------- = mean
6
Where: te = the estimated time for an activity to be completed
a = the most optimistic time
m = the most likely time
b = the most pessimistic time
In this formula; a, m, and b are simply the best judgments of
knowledgeable persons who may have had some experience with similar _
projects in the past. (Oh Josiah, where art thou?)
Once all the time estimates are made for individual
activities, the total time for the proje.ct can be estimated by
simply adding them up. The probability of meeting the deadline for
the project can then be determined by comparing the time estimates
with the time which has been scheduled. This is done by computing
a Z factor which is taken to a table of probabilities. without
going into the formula for Z, it is sufficient to note that when TE
(the total estimated time for the project) equals TS (the scheduled
time for the project) then Z will equal zero. When zero is taken to
the table of probabilities it will be observed that the probability
factor is .5. What this means, then, is that you have a 50% chance
of meeting your deadline for the project. The only way to increase
this probability is to extend the deadline. However, when this is
done, you run the ',risk of invoking' the Peter Principle which says
that, at a minimum, work expands to fill the time allotted to it
and thus your cost estimates are likely to be low. (Moder et
al.1983). Probabilities above .6 suggest that you are using too
many resources to achieve your deadlines (Federal Electric
Corporation, 1964).
The time estimates discussed above relate to the
accomplishment of activities within projects. Of a more serious and
fundamental nature are the time estimates ordinarily used for
bringing about socio-economic development. The time horizon of
planners, administrators and politicians is unrealistically short
in terms of what is involved in affecting fundamental change in
society. National plans and development proj ects are typically
written in five year terms during which major accomplishments
re~arding health, education, and welfare are to take place.
However, development takes generations, not five or even ten years.
Douglas Ensminger at the University of Missouri has argued that a
minimum of three generations are required before the societal
transformations necessary for development can be expected to occur.
Because we have the. wrong time frame, we plan proj ects with
unrealistically short durations which don't allow time for the
changes to occur. Then we evaluate them excessively early and find
that they haven't really·, achieved all they were supposed to.
In the Experts Speak: The Definitive Compendium of
Authoritative Misinformation, Christopher Cerf and Victor Navasky,
(1984) have compiled a weighty tome of estimates and predictions by
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knowledgeable people all of which have proven to be dead wrong. A
few selections are enough to indicate that expert advice isn't
always reliable and that experts characteristically disagree with
each other in fundamental ways. In commenting on Edison's electric
light bulb in 1879, Henry Morgan, professor of physics and
president of Steven' s Institute of Technology said "How can he
(Thomas Alva Edison) call it a wonderful success when everyone
acquainted with the subject will recognize it as a conspicuous
failure?"; On atomic energy, Albert Einstein is quoted as saying
"There is not the slightest indication that (nuclear) energy will
ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be
shattered at will.". Thomas watson, Chairman of the Board of IBM,
is reputed to have said "I think there is a world market for about
five computers". Several "experts" echoed Lord Kelvin's remark that
"heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible" (Lord Kelvin,
British mathematician, physicist, and President of the ~ritish
Royal Society, 1895).
The authors of this compendium of "expert misinformation,
disinformation, misunderstanding, miscalculation, egregious
prognostication, boo-boos and occasional just plain lies "conclude
that "experts are wrong without regard to race, color, creed, sex,
discipline, specialty, country, CUlture, or century.They are wrong
about facts, they are wrong about theories, they are wrong about
dates, they are wrong about geography, they are wrong about the
future, they are wrong about the past, and at best they are
misleading about the present, not to mention next week". However,
they do not deny that experts are sometimes right. All experts are
not always wrong. Perhaps they are right about half the time. (Cerf
and Navasky, 1984).
VI VARIABLES
Most social and economic development projects, including
community development are designed to bring about some form of
change. Usually in these projects, the changes are aimed at some
form of behavioral and/or attitudinal change. These changes are in
turn intended to bring about some other desired state of affairs.
Farmers are asked to change their CUltivation practices in order to
increase their productivity which is supposed to increase their
income and thus raise their level of living. Communities are
advised to engage in self-help activities in order to develop their
own leadership and other potentials thus becoming more self-reliant
and in the process making the community a better place to live.
Among the many reasons for projects not working out as planned
involves the nature of the variables we are working with and their
cause and effect relationships. First of all, we are not in a
position in the social sciences where we can predict with any
degree of certainty what the cause and effect relationships are
between any two or more variables. We are, on the other hand, very
well aware of the fact that there are several variables at work at
any given time all of which are interacting with each other. We
often summarize this state of affairs with the statement that there
is an interrelated system of variables at work each of which is
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having some effect on the others. This is easy to say but extremely
difficu~t to speJ.~ out in concrete terms with any degree of
specificity. What are these variables? How are they interrelated
at any point in time and how do these re~ationships vary ~~rcugh
time or in changed circumstances?
It is my contention that (a) we do not know all the variables
which cause the effects we observe in the social or economic
development fields; (b) we do not know with any degree of certainty
how the different variables are related to each other. Therefore,
we can't adequately predict how a change in one unit of Y will
cause some change in Xi and finally, (c) we can't control how all
these variables work. To the extent these points are true, projects
will not work as planned except through sheer happenstance. It is
instructive here to note that Lincoln Gordon, (1984) one of the
economic advisors for ~~e Marshall Plan, is on record as saying the
Marshall Plan worked "not so much from accuracy in diagnosis as
from partly accidental correctness of prescription" (p. 54-55).
Perhaps Murphy was right when he said that no amount of careful
planning, minute attention to detail or pracision in timing can
succeed like dumb luck!
The diagram below prepared by a Ford Foundation team of
Factors Related to Increasing
India's Food Production
SOil
p 0§
~ 0-<', .... "~ " .! ~CIt IResearch qrl". ~~
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agricultural experts illustrates the complications bearing on
programs of social change. This diagram partially depicts the
variables involved in raising food production in India. According
to the Foundation's experts, there are over seventy variables
related to increasing food production in India. Only about half of
these are shown in the diagram and only a part of the
interrelationships among these are suggested! This serves to
illustrate the complexity of the systems approach which we are fond
of proclaiming in the social sciences. until we can diagram the
social system we are attempting to change and give the different
variables the differential weights they deserve, and then show how
each is related to the others, we will not be in a position to
guide the process of social change to achieve what we set out to
achieve with any degree of certainty. However, one thing does
appear fairly certain: just like the ad for potato chips which
says: "I bet you can't eat just one"; in the field of social change,
you can't change just one thing.
An important insight concerning the magnitude of the problems
we are facing in attempting to understand and organize the process
of social change is provided in the Encyclopedia of World Problems
and Human Potential, 1986. This encyclopedia is a source book of
over 4, 500 world problems with their perceived interconnections and
the "human resources available to analyze, challenge and ultimately
solve them"! It contains a clarification of over l, 000 human
values; 250 human development concepts; descriptions of more than
1,800 relevant intellect~al disciplines and sciences; a compendium
of social transformation strategies and processes; a listing of
24,000 international organizations and networks; a list of related
occupations and roles; and 50,000 cross references linking entries
to conceptual sections and to the human values violated by the
problem. When one co~siders the complexity of these issues and then
realizes that each individual on the earth only represents two
one-hundred millionths of one percent of the world's population it
is easy to see how feeble our efforts are in controlling the
variables which are operating to produce the realities which we
experience (not to mention that these realities are different for
different people!).
One is tempted to say that the answer to our understanding and
control is research.- more and better research! Although few would
argue against this position it is instructive to note that the Coca
Cola company engaged in over four years of research before it
decided to change its formula. within two weeks of marketing its
new formula it had to retreat back to the original formulation.
Meadows et al.(1974) spent an enormous amount of time analyzing a
multitude of variables related to five major trends of global
concern. Suffice it to say that other professionals have taken the
analytical model to task and that the authors themselves have
characterized it as imperfect, oversimplified, and unfinished.
In spite of the immensities involved in ordering the universe
or its subparts, the American attitude appears undaunted. The
current American attitude toward change and our capacity to control
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it is perhaps epitomized by a statement by the Congressional
Clearinghouse On The Future in which these members of Congress say
that they "believe that they, and others, have the responsibility
to shape and choose the future" (Congressional Clearinghouse on The
Future and The Congressional Institute for The Future). It is
hoped that this paper will illuminate the fatuously arrogant
presumption that the u.s. Congress or anyone else can determine
the future.
A more realistic attitude toward our problems and our capacity
to solve them may be illustrated with a comment by Martin Anderson,
former domestic-policy advisor to President Reagan concerning a
proposal to revamp the welfare program: "To start a new national
program, in view of how little we know, would be irresponsible."
(U.S. News and World Report, June 30,1986).
VII CORRUPTION
Proj ects may be corrupted in several different ways. The most
common use of this term refers to a dishonest use or misdirection
of project funds or other resources for personal gain. When this
form of malfeasance occurs, it is fairly obvious that projects will
suffer and be unable to obtain their planned results. The extent of
this form of corruption is not clear but there are enough scandals
brought to light to suggest that this may be a fairly important
explanation for the failure of some projects.
Nonfeasance is a form of corruption which occurs when project
administrators or other personnel do not carry out the activities
for which funds are made available. Misfeasance occurs when these
funds are used to achieve purposes which are different than those
for which funds were budgeted. There are many reasons for these
forms of corruption among which is the separation of proj ect
planners from project implementors. When government funded projects
prohibit the planners from bidding on the implementation to avoid
a conflict of interest, then the probability of the project not
being implemented as planned is increased. One of the hallmarks of
a professional is to be able to make independent analyses and
conclusions from a data set. Unfortunately, or fortunately,
depending on how you look at it, professionals in most fields of
endeavor tend to disagree with each other concerning the meaning of
the same data and oftentimes argue that the data on which
conclusions were drawn were insufficient or wrong. Because of this,
professionals who implement plans will often change them based on
their own "superior" wisdom. When this happens, it is obviously
difficult for the original objectives to be achieved as planned.
Wholey (1979), Rutman (1980), and others within the
professional evaluation community have commented on the lack of
program delivery. This form of corruption is sufficiently
widespread that they have introduced the concept of program
evaluability along with a set of procedures to determine, inter
alia, if the program was actually delivered before engaging in its
evaluation. It should be pointed out, that there are some programs
which are impossible to implement as planned due to the poor nature
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of the planning and thus the fault lies not with the implementors,
but with the planners.
VIII PROBABILITIES
Given the rather high degree of uncertainty concerning the
variables we are working with and how they interact with each other
we will always be working with unknown probabilities and can never
be certain of what will happen once a project is started. In the
Ford Foundation example above, some seventy variables were
suggested as being related to increasing food production in India.
If one were to assign probability factors to each of these and then
compute the overall probability for a project working as planned it
would soon become apparent that the cards are stacked against you.
According to probability theory, the probability of mUltiple events
occurring, when each event is independent of the other, is
determined by the product of the individual probabilities. Thus, if
two independent events each have a probability of .9; then the
probability of both of them occurring is .9 X .9 = .81. A
probability of .9 is quite high, but a simple calculation shows
that when only seven variables are involved, each with a
probability of .9, the chance of all of them occurring is .48 or
less than half the time. If three more events are added to round it
out at ten; the probability of all ten taking place is just over
one-third (35%). If only one of these ten were to have a
probability of .7, then the overall probability would be just over
one-fourth (27%). On 'the other hand, if the probabilities of each
variable could be increased nearer to certainty, say .95, for each,
then by time we have 14 variables operating the probability that
they will all occur will have fallen to under half (49%). If only
one of these 14 variables were to have a probability of .7 then the
overall probability would be around two-fifths (42%). But if one
were to be increased to .99, then with the 14 variables, the
overall probability would still only be just over half at 51%.
Because most projects usually involve more than a dozen or so
variables and because their probabilities and degree of
independence are only vaguely known, the probability of things
working as planned is very low. Richard Ofshe has reminded us that
all scientific predictions assume that all conditions will remain
constant over time. This assumption isn't always made explicit and
it usually doesn't correspond with reality. If we could enumerate
all the independent causal variables .invo.lved in a prediction about
a social process, the prediction would be extremely low. "If as few
as ten important variables each had a probability of changing only
.1, then the probability of the prediction proving correct would be
nine to the tenth power. It hardly seems worth the effort to state
a prediction that has only this probability of being correct."
(Ofshe , 1970, p. 256). When one looks at the high percentage of new
businesses, especially small enterprises, which fail, then the
cogency of probabilities strikes home. About two-thirds of all
retail establishments in the u.S. fail to survive for more than
five years (Stern,1986).
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IX EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENT
In commenting on the conclusions of the Coleman report
concerning the marginal influence of schooling on educational
achievement (Guba, 1972) has raised serious questions concerning
our capacity to design instruments which will in fact measure the
outcomes of social programs. He says that empirical research
evidence often contradicts the experiential evidence of
practitioners. Research instruments fail to affirm what
practitioners and clients say is happening. We know, he asserts,
that the ineffectiveness of the school system as reported by
Coleman's research is simply not true. Clinical evidence that
evaluation is unable to measure outputs adequately, he says, is
available from several sources: (1) planners and administrators
fail to include it in their programs, and avoid funding it whenever
possible (2) practitioners become very anxious when evaluations are
conducted (3) meaningful and operational guidelines for evaluation
usually don't exist (4) most evaluation designs are deficient and
(5) over and over, evaluation reports find no significant
difference between the treatment group and the control group.
(Guba, 1972). In a study of federally funded evaluations by
Bernstein and Freeman, it was concluded that "about half the
studies that measure impact were deficient either in design,
sampling, or validity of meaning." (Rutman, 1980, p. 32).
Berk and Rossi indicate that most applied social research
professionals are more proficient in studying individual behavior
than they are at studying social organizations. They can report on
statistical collectivities of individuals but can't say much about
the social systems which might be causing the observed behavior.
Evaluation research designs tend to follow program designs which
treat individuals and social units as independent units sUbject to
change without any effects from or on the social system of which
they are a part. This flies in the face of systems theory which
most social scientists, including the researchers, adhere to.
In spite of these weaknesses in evaluation research, program
administrators and other readers of evaluation studies often turn
to the evaluators for advice on what to do to correct the problems
which have been uncovered. This is the -"you found a problem; now
give-me-a-solution syndrome. It is considered a weakness to reply
that this is not my job or to make some other excuse for not coming
up with an answer, so most evaluators wade in where they have no
business. Evaluation studies observe what did or did not happen.
They make no observations of what might have happened or what could
happen. They do not study the causes that would produce better
results. Therefore, evaluators have no particular expertise in
designing new programs. For this reason, it is perhaps valuable
that most evaluation reports aren't used for redesigning projects.
It's just possible then, that evaluation, like other projects,
doesn't work as planned! To the extent this is true then perhaps we
don't really know whether things are working or not or the degree
to which they mayor may not be working. It is just possible that
even though programs don't achieve t~eir intended effects that they
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have much more substantial effects on the lives of the people
associated with them which although not intended and not measured
are nevertheless real and which may become evident years from now
(Moynihan, 1968).
X BUREAUCRATIZATION AND GOAL DISPLACEMENT
There are literally dozens, if not hundreds, of books and
articles dealing with the propensity of organizations to substitute
means for ends and to turn inward and/or upward in their efforts to
survive. Although the term bureaucracy usual carries an image of
large scale pUblic agencies the process of bureaucratization is not
limited to this arena. Private organizations in the profit and
non-profit sectors may also be bureaucratized. We ordinarily think
of large scale organizations with a high proportion of professional
employees as being the most susceptible to this process. Studies
have shown however, that small scale organizations and those
comprised of volunteers may also be bureaucratized.
It is common knOWledge that the first rule of organizational
behavior is survival. Once this is accepted, then the organization
must behave in whatever way is required to achieve this purpose.
The individuals within the organization become secondary and the
clientele (the original purpose for existence for public and
voluntary organizations) becomes tertiary. The requirements for
existence are first and foremost to satisfy the power structure
which has control over the funding, if not the actual existence, of
the ,organization. To dO,this, the agency or organization has to
develop a good reputation and as stanton (1970) asserts, it must
project a positive image or impression that it is performing well
and achieving its objectives. It is important to remember that for
agencies dealing with socia-economic change or welfare, the buyer
(funder) and the consumer (clientele) a're not only different but
far removed in physical, psychological and socio-economic distance.
This "situation presents a sizeable problem: to achieve its
professed goals, the agency must serve the consumer; but to
survive, it need only please the donor. Theoretically therefore, by
controlling negative feedback, the organization can substitute
packaging for product. with the elimination of constraints, image
manipulation may be substituted for goal directed action".
(stanton, 1970, p. 27).
Selznick and other observers of the bureaucratic scene discuss
goal displacement in terms of the personnel becoming more
interested in their own personal security and welfare than they are
about the organization's goals. All formal organizations contain an
informal structure which arises spontaneously based on personality
and power relationships. This informal structure acts to control
the processes within the organization for the benefit of its
members and this acts to change the goals of the organization
(Selznick, 1943).• When functionaries give emphasis to procedural
matters over and above the substantive purpose of the organization,
the classical case of means over ends prevails and goal
displacement is in full force.
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One other consequence of the bureaucratic mode needs to be
mentioned because of its pervasive and insidious influence on
organizations and the design and implementation of projects. This
is the overwhelming desire to measure and quantify the outputs. Fed
strongly by the desire to be accountable for the expenditure of
funds, agencies and organizations are moving rapidly toward what
(Geertz,1984) has termed 'quantophrenia' in which qualitative or
soft data are quantified. The results of this orientation is that
those aspects of life which are measurable in quantifiable terms
are given emphasis over the nonmeasurable dimensions (Etzioni,
1964). "Outcomes that can be counted easily tend to be listed as
the outcomes desired" and these are the goals which are measured in
evaluation studies (Berk and Rossi, 1976). When this happens in
projects, then we are back to the problem of not dealing with a
full deck of cards but unfortunately, we don't know which ones are
missing. Related to this is the bureaucratic restrictions on the
use of funds. Funds are usually made available in advance of
project implementation for certain expenditures only. This
restriction presupposes full knowledge of the problem and its
solution. It also reinforces the notion that change can be made
piecemeal and in isolation from the social system within which the
problem-to-be-solved exists.
SUMMARY
In summary, projects don't work as planned because the data
base on which they are planned and which is used to define problems
and solutions is inadequate; assumptions about human behavior and
especially the project',s clientele are not necessarily valid;
externalities have an indeterminable influence on project
operations; the communication process is often weak and subject to
varying degrees of misunderstanding; the time and cost estimates
and predictions are subject to large errors and unanticipated
changes; cause and effect variables and not fully understood or
controllable; there is an unknown degree of corruption operating
with regard to project operations and the use of available funds;
the probabilities of all necessary events taking place properly
within the required time sequence is low; our capacity to evaluate
project outcomes is weak; and the agencies responsible for projects
tend to become bureaucratized which leads to goal displacement.
In view of these difficulties and the history of failed
efforts one should, to "coin" a phrase: ask not why things don't
work as planned, but ask why things work as well as they do or why
they work at all. Given this state of affairs a legitimate question
is how does one explain the fact that there are successful
projects? The second section of this paper identifies the major
variables which are related to successful project implementation.
However, one needs to keep in mind that what is called. successful
isn't necessarily what was planned and thus successful projects may
also fall into the category of proj ects which don't work as
planned. It is commonplace to talk about the unanticipated
consequences of proj ects. These consequences are often discussed in
terms of the negative outcomes, but they can also be positive in
nature.
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"SOLUTIONS"
The position expressed above regarding our ability to identify
and control the variables affecting projects might be summarized by
saying that the reason projects don't work as planned is because we
are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. In more mundane terms it is
because of Murphy's Law which says: whatever can possibly go wrong
will and that if several things can go wrong, the one that causes
the most damage will be the one to go wrong.
The pitfalls identified above merely indicate some of the
reasons why Murphy was right. In this section, the term "solutions"
is put in quotations because there really aren't any solutions. We
would just like to think there are. We would like nothing better
than a formula which could be applied which would, as if by magic,
solve all these difficulties and make things work out as we planned
them. As H.L. Menken has said: for every difficult, complex problem
there is a simple and easy solution - and it's always wrong!
Although formulas don't exist, it is possible to review the
literature and report on some research findings which seem to
suggest some approaches to project planning and implementation
which if used should serve to improve our chances of obtaining
positive results.
THE LITERATURE
Much of what will be presented here relies on the following
authors who, in large part, seem to agree with each other and who
have come to their· positions as a result of studying a number of
projects around the world. (Korten, 1980); (Paul, 1982, 1983);
(Development Alternatives, 1975); (Moris, 1981); ( The World Bank,
1983); (Coombs, 1980); (Fortin and Stiefel, 1985); (Shanner.W.W. et
al., 1982); (Ensminger, 1977); (Ford Foundation, 1981); and
(Dasgupta, 1967). In addition to these sources, some of my own
ideas are presented and identified when these aren't backed by
research.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommended principles and practices listed below are
classified into a number of categories but are not presented in any
order of importance or priority. Each one of these is important in
its own right and each is necessary, but none of them alone is
sufficient.
Research
The farming systems approach is giving important attention to
knowing what the local conditions are before engaging in
recommendations for change. Taken a step further, it is necessary
to understand as much as possible about a local situation before
attempting to organize a change program. This is fairly obvious to
development practitioners but is usually observed in the breach. It
is also important that in conducting the necessary research that
the local inhabitants of the program communities be involved
21
through a participatory process in what today is called
participatory research. The object of the research should be to
describe the social system in sufficient detail that the cause and
effect linkages which have produced the problem(s) can be
identified.
Problem identification should come out of the study rather
than being predetermined by social change agents with programs to
sell. It should be clear by now that when health professionals
visit a community they see health problems and when agricultural
professionals visit they see agricultural problems just as
educators see educational problems. This specialization is a
function of our educational system in which knowledge has been
divided and compartmentalized into departments each of which has
its own language and world view. The advantage of specialization is
the contribution it makes to our knowledge about the subject matter
under study. The disadvantage is that the analytical process
proceeds by dissecting the subject matter into ever diminishing
pieces which it fails to recombine and relate to the totality of
the system of which it is a part. Because there is no synthesis the
individual parts take on lives of their own and become all
important. This leads directly to the predetermination of problems
without the need for research.
Properly performed, the research would not only identify the
problems in a cause and effect manner but would also show the
relationships of one problem to the other. Since life is lived
holistically and ./within a' system of interdependent parts the
research should result in a matrix of problems and provide an
action agenda with a timetable showing the order in which the
problems should be addressed. It should also indicate who the
actors are who need to be involved, including the identification of
the proper clientele. An estimate of the opposing forces should be
made with proposals suggesting how to overcome the opposition. The
research would also identify local and outside resources which can
be brought to bear on the problems identified and indicate the
necessary inputs for addressing the problems in conformity with the
projected timetable. Simply put, do the best job possible to
understand the local situation so you improve your predictions
about what will happen if the program is implemented. If simulation
models can be constructed properly, they should be used.
Geertz (1983) has distinguished between convergent and
divergent data. The description of a community social system in
terms of how it operates holistically and how the individual
personalities relate to each other as human beings within the
social structure is partiCUlaristic and convergent. Divergent data
tends to be statistical in nature in which people are put into
categories and classes within which they don't relate to each other
in any meaningfUl way such as all women, all rice growers, all
school leavers, etc. Data of this type are ordinarily collected
through surveys, polls, questionnaires, censuses etc. and are used
to make generalizations about statistical classes. Samples are
frequently used along with procedures for error estimation and
tests of significance.
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In the best of all worlds, community research, especially for
large communities, should use both types of research. However, the
convergent data collected through participant observation and other
ethnographic techniques is essential in understanding how a
community operates. The unwary must also be cautioned in using
aggregate statistical data that they don't make the rather easy
mistake of assuming that the correlations obtained will pertain to
the individuals within the statistical class. This is Robinson's
famous ecological correlation in which he showed that there is no
relationship between correlations based on grouped data and
correlations based on individual data. For example, one cannot
correlate job training and unemployment rates and conclude that job
training has had an effect on employment unless employment data are
available on the job trainees as individuals (Robinson, 1950).
Equally, if not more, important than the type of data collected is
the data collectors. Community research should as far as possible
be conducted by the residents themselves with the aid of research
professionals who can provide the necessary guidance in collection
and analysis.
Participation
Just about all observers, agencies, researchers and
development specialists today recognize the importance of
participation of the local people in the development process.
However, few of them understand the extent to which people need to
be involved and few agencies can be found which implement their own
rhetoric. To be effective, participation needs to take place
initially at the policy level. Although a huge amount of literature
is produced on poverty'and race relations in the u.s. very little
of this is produced by blacks or the ethnic minorities. Much of
what is written and purported as what we "know" in the social
sciences is produced by whites of which about two thirds are either
Jews or Catholics. The policy makers who conceived the poverty
program and those who administered it knew very little about black
poverty. No blacks were involved in any significant way in the
planning of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the same was
essentially true of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders which was basically the work of white social scientists
(Moynihan, 1968). It should also be noted that very few women were
(or are) involved at the policy or any other official or profess-
ional level either. The inclusion of women and minorities in the
decision-making process is crucial because of the perspective they
bring and because of the degree to which they are involved in the
problem situations which most development programs address.
Other levels where participation is required include all
aspects of project design, implementation and evaluation. As noted
above, it should include the initial research which identifies how
the system works and what the problems are which need to be
addressed. This is more than a simple needs assessment. It is a
needs assessment plus the establishment of cause. Further, the
participation needs to be active and meaningful rather then
passive. This means that the program beneficiaries need to not only
be involved in decision-making but must commit some of their own
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economic and other resources to the program. It also means that
agency personnel must be prepared to listen to community
initiatives and not approach the community with set ideas of what
the problems and solutions are. When the impetus for change comes
from within the community and the community asks an agency for
assistance there is a better chance for success than if the agency
brings a program in and tries to convince th~ community that it has
a problem.
communication
To avoid the problems of misunderstanding, a number of simple
rules should be observed. First is the use of simple words which
the majority of people understand. In attempting to reach the
people, however, it is best not to use colloquialisms or slang
word..:; which may be "in words" for one section of the population but
not. for other sections. Second, to reduce the problems of
interpretation, use words which have concrete versus abstract
meaning. A third rule is to use the same word as often as possible
to convey the intended meaning. Using synonyms is an acceptable
practice as long as the meaning is the same. Unfortunately, in the
process of avoiding the boredom of repetition, the use of a
different word can change to entire meaning. As Orwell, (1961, p.
366) advises, "let the meaning choose the word, and not the other
way about". Following these rules may reduce the literary value of
the written word, but development projects aren't literary events
and project documents aren't intended to be literary masterpieces.
A fourth rule, usually observed in the breach, is to pre-test
your messages. -Although this rule is most applicable to messages
intended to convey information to a client population, it is also
essential in survey research and very useful for testing clarity of
any document before it is finalized. Asking one or more neutral
observers to read and react to what you have written to see if the
intended message is clear will prove to be very effective and
efficient. Smith, (1980) reports on a pretesting service which is
available in the u.S. He indicates that he is working on developing
countries applications for pre-program testing of messages. A fifth
rule relates to special terms or abstract words. If such words
must be used, be sure to define them clearly according to the way
you intend them to be understood. Operational definitions are very
useful for this -purpose. In so far as possible, avoid emotionally
loaded words which tend to incite strong passions, biases or
stereotypical responses.
From the welter of books and guidelines for good communica-
tion, one would not go far wrong by adhering to the six rules of
George Orwell (1961):
1. Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech
which you are used to seeing in print.
2. Never use a long word where a short one will do.
3. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.
4. Never use the passive where you can use the active.
5. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or jargon
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word if you can think of an everyday equivalent
6. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything
outright barbarous.
All these rules apply to good writing and good speech within
any language. On a cross-cultural basis, whether international
where different languages are involved, or within a country where
different sub-cultures are involved, there is an added dimension.
One must be certain that the words, concepts, etc. employed mean
the same "thing in one language or culture as they do in another.
Translations need to be thoroughly checked with representatives of
the cultures involved to be sure that the intended meaning is
actually being sent.
Education and Training
It is my own view that education and training should be
provided for all beneficiaries and project personnel on a
continuing basis. Training programs need to be devised which
initially will assist citizens in participating in the original
research on the community. This will involve data collection and
analysis. Providing information on where resources are is another
important training area. The staff needs training in participa-
tory research techniques and how to work with people at the
community level. Training should be conducted which provides
farmers and extension staff the most relevant, up to-date,
information at the most opportune time for it to be used in the
decision-making processes,. In fact, one could view the entire
development process as one of education and training in which the
objectives would be to enable the citizenry to obtain the knowledge
and skills necessary for the resolution of local problems.
Bureaucratic Organization
Because individuals and communities are particularistic and
differ from each other in important ways, programs involving local
communities need to be implemented on a decentralized basis.
Decision-making regarding project matters needs to be as close to
the scene of action as possible. The project leader needs to have
control over the project with as much autonomy as feasible. Project
personnel need to be in the community as much as possible and need
to establish open communication channels with th.e citizens. Project
managers need to have control over who is assigned and who will
remain on the project.
Most pUblic agencies involved in development work use some
form of bidding for the planning and/or implementation of projects.
This results in a different set of implementors than planners. Once
project plans are approved a search is made for a good
administrator or manager to implement the plan. A stronger and
preferred approach is to identify good leaders or managers and give
them the authority to develop their own project - in cooperation
with the people, as proposed above. The project manager under this
arrangement has a direct line of responsibility to the people in
the community as well as being responsible to higher officials for
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the administration of funds.
The Learning Process Approach
Korten (1980) has made a cogent analysis of a number of
successful development projects in Asia. His conclusions,
suggestions, and the conceptual framework he provides parallel the
findings and recommendations of several other observers. The main
recommendations emanating from these works include the following:
- Projects require strong local leadership. It is important to
work through local leaders who are honest and who have
the interest of the community and its disadvantaged
members at heart.
- Projects require constant contact between the staff and
the community members or other clientele group.
- Projects must have a people centered emphasis.
- It is necessary to build local organizations which can
take responsibility for the project.
- A good feed-back loop which provides up to-date
information in a monitoring sense is essential. This
information should go to the staff and the local people.
- Development as~istance programs must be part of a
holistical'ly perceived learning process; not a
bureaucratically designed and mandated blue print.
Programs can't be designed and implemented like an
architect might design and build a building. Programs
have to emerge as you go along and be constantly adjusted
and readjusted depending on the feed back received. It's
more like the process Edison used in inventing the
incandescent light when he kept trying different
materials until he finally found one that worked.
- The bureaucratic structure within which projects operate
must be a learning organization which can recognize and
learn from its mistakes without defining a project a
failure when it doesn't succeed immediately in reaching
its desired objectives.
- start small and learn to be effective before taking on
larger projects or expanding to other areas.
- Use an integrate~, interdisciplinary approach in which
problems are viewed holistically and where the people and
staff from all technical and administrative offices work
together cooperatively. (I make a distinction between
integrated and comprehensive. Comprehensive implies
working on all problems at once which is usually
impossible. The integrated approach sorts out through
research, as recommended above, the major problems in
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order of priority and their interrelationships. Once the
interrelationships and consequences of changing one part
of the system are traced out, the program makes provision
for the dislocations and other effects, positive or
negative, which the proposed change entails).
A Development Philosophy
An overall philosophy of development is essential for
formulating project objectives and governing the decision-making
process. There is perhaps no better way to conclude this paper than
with a quote from Julius Nyerere's philosophy which if practiced
along with the specific recommendations listed above would go a
long way toward resolving the development problems we all face. It
is assumed, although not stated by him, that the use of the word
"man", includes women. Unfortunately, the evidence from Tanzqnian
shows that while the philosophy was good the implementation was
poor thus showing that while a good philosophy is necessary it is
insufficient in itself.
"For the truth is that development means the development of
people. Roads, buildings, the increases in crop output, and
other things of this nature are not development; they are
only the tools of development ... Development brings freedom,
provided it is of people. But people cannot be developed,
they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for
an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give
the man p~ide and self-confidence in himself as a human
being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own
actions. He'develops himself by what he does; he develops
himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his
understanding of what he is doing, and why; by increasing his
knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation - as
an equal - in the life of the community he lives in. Thus, for
example a man is developing himself when he grows, or earns
enough to provide decent conditions for himself and his
family; he is not being developed if someone gives him
these things. A man is developing when he improves his
education whatever he learns about; he is not being
developed if he simply carries out orders from someone better
educated than himself without understanding why these orders
have been given. A man develops himself by joining in free
discussion of a new venture, and participating in the
subsequent decision; he is not being developed if he is herded
like an animal into the new venture. Development of a man can,
in fact, only be effected by that man; development of the
people can only be effected by the people.
There is only one way in which you can cause people to under-
take their own development. That is by education and leader-
ship. Through these means - and no other - people can be
helped to understand both their needs, and the things which
they can do to satisfy these needs.
Finally, if development is to increase people's freedom, it
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must be development for the people. It must serve them, and
their interests. Every proposal must be judged by the
criterion of whether it serves the purpose of development -
and the purpose of development is people. Yet if a proposal
contributes to the development of people, and if it is being
carried out by the people of their own free will, it will
automatically be for the people's interests, provided three
conditions are fulfilled. First, if the people understand
their own needs; second, if they understand how these needs
can be met; and third, if they have the freedom to make
their own decisions and to carry them into effect." (Nyerere,
1975).
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